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The Wars of French Decolonization focuses on the period from the end of World War II to the 
recognition of Algerian independence in 1962. It is the second title in a new series of studies projected by 
Longman. “Modern Wars in Perspective," that will examine specific wars and phases of warfare from the 
Middle Ages to the present. According to the series editors, their purpose is to move beyond traditional 
campaign narrative to assess the causes and consequences of major conflicts within the context of key social, 
political, diplomatic and ideological developments. 
If other volumes in the series accomplish these objectives as successfully as Anthony Clayton has 
done in this little book, then military history in general will be well-served. Clayton has published 
extensively on both the French and British military presence in Africa in the twentieth century. It comes as 
no surprise, therefore, that the French experience of decolonization is frequently compared (unfavorably) to 
that of Great Britain. The survey focuses considerable attention on the two major French wars of 
decolonization in Indochina and Algeria during the 1950s, but also interweaves analyses of smaller but still 
significant French military operations in Syria and Lebanon, Madagascar, Tunisia and Morocco. The violent 
story of France's disengagement from empire is told against the political backdrop of the collapse of the 
Fourth Republic at home and the birth of the Fifth. 
In nearly every case the French were handcuffed by their own prevailing colonial philosophy of 
assimilation — a set of assumptions that rejected colonial movement toward independence and autonomy.   
This led them to ignore local political values such as nationalism. Instead of recognizing certain 
manifestations of anti-French resistance as not unreasonable reactions to prevailing conditions, these were 
generally brushed aside as the result of British or American meddling and repressed. Repression led to 
bloody reprisal, expansion of resistance to French control and, eventually, to the evaporation of national 
consensus at home on the maintenance empire. Whether more sensitive military leadership would have 
avoided the loss of France's empire in the long run is doubtful. But Clayton concludes that the experience 
from 1945 to 1962 shows that, 'Theatre Commanders and Service Chiefs must be well educated politically so 
that they are sensitive to the politics of any military situation, but not themselves become involved 
politically . . .." (p. 184) Alistair Home reached similar conclusions in 1984 in The French Army and 
Politics, 1870-1970. 
Inescapably, the central figure in the story of French decolonization is Charles de Gaulle. Clayton's 
portrait of him is carefully nuanced. He does not accept at face value, for example, the general's own 
explanation of his apparent dithering between Algerie francaise and Algerie algerienne as a skillfully 
calculated policy (as Alistair Home did in A Savage War of Peace. 1978). In this book de Gaulle appears 
much less prescient about his ultimate decision on Algerian independence. Clayton acknowledges, however, 
his political acumen in securing a majority vote in the Assembly in May 1958, in support of his emergency 
appointment to the prime ministership. This move secured his political legitimacy without leaving him 
beholden to the army. 
Unlike many other French military officers of the post-World War I era, de Gaulle never served in either 
North or sub-Saharan Africa. After the war, he opted to accompany the French military mission to Poland to 
fight the Bolsheviks rather than to participate in the pacification campaigns in Morocco. As a result, de 
Gaulle developed no emotional ties either to Africa or to the concept of empire. 
Above all, de Gaulle is portrayed as a realist principally concerned with the international standing of 
France. If the maintenance of empire would serve to assert great power status, then Empire should be 
preserved. But if imperial wars served to weaken France, then de Gaulle was equally prepared to cut his 
colonial losses in order to assure stability at home and preserve a leading role for France among the major 
powers of the world. Thus, when the national consensus on Algeria threatened to evaporate into civil war in 
1959-61, he moved to recognize Algerian independence. This analysis is fully consistent with Ian S. 
Lustick's recent reexamination of the Algerian War in Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (1993). Sensitive to 
the army's repeated setbacks in the colonial arena in the 1950s and 1960s, the French president insisted upon 
maintaining an independent nuclear force de frappe throughout the remainder of his administration. 
Appendixes contain an array of useful supplementary materials: chronology of key events, list of 
abbreviations, biographical notes on key individuals, regional maps, and a short bibliographical essay. The 
Wars of French Decolonization is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate reading lists in modern 
European history. 
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